The claim that "politics is not the business of a scholar of fiqh"
Unfounded
Claim
Fact
The assumption the claim rests on is this: Islamic fiqh consists of prayer, fasting and zakat. If the assumption were correct the conclusion would be correct too — but it is not.
In the sources of fiqh there have stood for centuries chapters on the running of the state, on the rulings of war and peace, on treaties and on relations with non-Muslims. Today these subjects are called "politics"; in the classical sources they are subjects of fiqh. Kuytul's answer begins here: "Does Islamic fiqh consist of prayer, fasting and zakat alone?"
The second reason has to do with the calling itself. A scholar of fiqh cannot put forward a sound view without knowing the society they live in; "a scholar of fiqh means a person who knows the society they are in." A scholar of fiqh who knows nothing of society cannot be right even in matters that concern acts of worship alone.
The third is the question of the example. The Prophet, who is the source of fiqh, did not stop at teaching acts of worship: he brought a movement into being, founded a state and governed that state.
Nor does Kuytul tie the measure of his view to his own title:
"The merit is not mine. The merit is in Islamic fiqh. When you keep to Islamic fiqh, you come to have a correct view."
The measure of a view's competence is not the professional label of the one speaking but the evidence it rests on.
He does not ask for this for himself alone either: he argues that putting forward a view about the course of the country is not a duty peculiar to him, and that other religious teachers who understand politics should state their convictions too.
The unspoken assumption of the claim
The sentence "politics is not the business of a scholar of fiqh" looks at first sight like a description of a field. Yet it carries within it a proposition accepted without discussion: that the boundaries of fiqh are the acts of worship. The claim rests on this proposition, and the proposition is not true.
The scope of fiqh does not end with acts of worship
In the classical sources of fiqh there are chapters reaching from the running of the state, the states of war and peace, treaties and relations with non-Muslims all the way to the division of spoils. In today's language these are gathered under the heading "politics"; in the sources they are subjects of fiqh itself.
Kuytul describes the type of religious teacher that is expected of him like this:
"They want me to be a teacher who answers only questions about the prayer, about ablution, and who meddles in nothing else."
What he objects to is not the narrowing of his own interests but the narrowing of fiqh itself. The scope of a branch of knowledge is not settled by the expectations of someone looking at it from outside.
A scholar of fiqh who does not know society cannot give a sound view
The second reason is more practical and meets the claim on its own ground:
"A scholar of fiqh, after all, means a person who knows the society they are in."
Fiqh is not an abstract list of rulings but the application of a ruling to a concrete situation. Someone who does not know the situation cannot put the ruling in its place. For this reason following the state of the country and of the world is not stepping outside the work of a scholar of fiqh but a requirement of it. Kuytul's finding is this: a scholar of fiqh who does not know society cannot be right even in matters that concern acts of worship alone.
The example is a simple one: whether it is permissible for one state to support another state's war is a question of fiqh, but its answer can be given only by knowing by whom, against whom and why that war is being waged. Knowing the ruling is not enough; the event has to be known as well.
The example of the Prophet
The third reason takes the claim back to the source of fiqh:
"Did our Prophet teach us these subjects alone? Did he not bring a movement into being? Did he not found a state with that movement, and did he not govern that state as well?"
The person counted as the foremost source of fiqh founded a community, founded a state and governed that state. To say that being a scholar of fiqh excludes concerning oneself with governance requires taking this example out of play.
The measure is not the title but the ground
When Kuytul is told that he was right in his past assessments, he does not put it down to his own insight:
"The merit is not mine. The merit is in Islamic fiqh."
This sentence moves the argument elsewhere. The question "are you qualified to speak on this?" cannot take the place of the question "what does what you say rest on?" A view is argued not by its holder's title but by its ground; if the ground is wrong the title does not save it, and if the ground is right the lack of a title does not refute it.
He does not ask this for himself alone
Finally, this is not a request for a personal exception. Kuytul lays the same responsibility on all people of learning: he argues that putting forward a view about the course of the country is not a duty peculiar to him, and that religious teachers who understand politics should state their convictions too.
This removes one more support from the claim: there is no attempt here to open up an area of authority for himself. What is said is that the silence of the people of learning in the face of the course of the country is not neutrality but a vacuum, and that someone else will fill that vacuum in any case.
There are two further pages closely related to this subject: the claim that "a religious teacher should not get involved in politics" and the "if he wants to do politics, let him found a party" claim.